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The Amnesty Exception to the




This article examines the paradoxical question of whether the Interna-
tional Criminal Court will require justice at the expense of peace. Notwith-
standing the popular catch phrase of the 1990s - "no peace without
justice"' - peace and justice are sometimes incompatible goals. To end an
international or internal conflict, negotiations must often be conducted
with the very leaders who were responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. When this is the case, insisting on criminal prosecu-
tions can prolong the conflict, resulting in more death, destruction, and
human suffering.2
Reflecting this reality, during the past several years, Argentina, Cambo-
dia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Uruguay, and South Africa have
each granted amnesty to members of the former regime that committed
international crimes within their respective borders as part of a peace
arrangement. 3 With respect to four of these countries - Cambodia, E1 Sal-
vador, Haiti, and South Africa - the United Nations pushed for, helped
negotiate, and/or endorsed, the granting of amnesty as a means of restor-
ing peace and democratic government.4
The term "amnesty" derives from the Greek word "amnestia" - mean-
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy,
New England School of Law; former Attorney-Adviser for U.N. Affairs, U.S. Department
of State; J.D. Duke University School of Law, 1988; A.B. Duke University, 1985.
1. See, e.g. David Rieff, The Precious Triumph of Human Rights, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 8,
1999, at 37.
2. As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted article: "The quest
for justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner
that it makes today's living the dead of tomorrow." Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace
Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 249, 258 (1996). One commentator has concluded that
this anonymous author is Lord David Owen, the Co-Chairman of the Yugoslavia Peace
Talks, see David Forsyth, International Criminal Courts: A Political View, 15 NrERLAN~ s
Q. HUM. RTs. 5, 9 n.11 (1997), but it is more likely from the context of the article that
the author was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Dayton talks.
3. See Michael P. Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1996);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights
Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 451, 458-61, 484 n.187 (1990).
4. See Scharf, supra note 3, at 1.
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ing "forgetfulness" or oblivion.5 In the present context, amnesty refers to
an act of sovereign power immunizing persons from criminal prosecution
for past offenses. 6
At the preparatory conference for the establishment of a permanent
International Criminal Court in August 1997, the U.S. Delegation circu-
lated a "nonpaper," which suggested that the proposed permanent court
should take into account such amnesties in the interest of international
peace and national reconciliation when deciding whether to exercise juris-
diction over a situation or to prosecute a particular offender. 7 According to
the U.S. text, the policies favoring prosecution of international offenders
must be balanced against the need to close "a door on the conflict of a past
era" and "to encourage the surrender or reincorporation of armed dissi-
dent groups," and thereby facilitate the transition to democracy. 8
While the U.S. proposal met with criticism from many quarters, the
final text of the Rome Statute contains several ambiguous provisions which
could be interpreted as codifying the U.S. proposal. This article examines
the policies and legal issues related to recognizing an amnesty exception to
the jurisdiction of a permanent international criminal court and analyzes
whether the text of the Rome Statute should be read as embodying such an
exception. This Article concludes that the existence of the International
Criminal Court does not remove amnesty as a bargaining chip available to
mediators attempting to bring an end to an international or internal
conflict.
I. Practical Considerations
A. Interests Favoring Amnesty
As Payam Akhavan of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has observed, "it is not unu-
sual in the political stage to see the metamorphosis of yesterday's war mon-
ger into today's peace broker."9 Leaders of the various parties to a conflict
must cooperate to put an end to the fighting and violations of international
humanitarian law. Yet, it is unrealistic to expect such leaders to agree to a
peace settlement if, directly following the agreement, they would find them-
selves or their close associates facing life imprisonment. Case studies in
Haiti, South Africa, and the Dayton Accords demonstrate that the offer of
5. See Norman Weisman, A History and Discussion of Amnesty, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REv. 529, 529 (1972).
6. See Commission on Human Rights, The Question of Human Rights of Persons Sub-
jected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Progress Report on the Question of the
Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, July 19, 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1993/6, at 12.
7. See generally U.S. Delegation Draft (Rev.) to the ICC PrepCom (Aug. 1997) (on
file with the author).
8. Id. at 1.
9. Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agree-
ment and Beyond, 18 Hum. RTS. Q. 259, 271 (1996).
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amnesty may be a necessary bargaining chip to induce human rights viola-
tors to agree to peace and relinquish power.10
1. Haiti
From 1990 to 1994, Haiti was ruled by a military regime headed by Gen-
eral Raol Cedras and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, which executed
over 3000 civilian political opponents and tortured scores of others..' The
United Nations mediated negotiations at Governors Island in New York
Harbor, in which the military leaders agreed to relinquish power and per-
mit the return of the democratically-elected civilian President (Jean-Ber-
trand Aristide) in return for full amnesty for the members of the regime
and a lifting of the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council.' 2
Under pressure from the United Nations mediators, Aristide agreed to the
amnesty clause of the Governors Island Agreement.' 3 The U.N. Security
Council immediately "declared [its] readiness to give the fullest possible
support to the Agreement signed on Governors Island,"' 4 which it later
said "constitutes the only valid framework for resolving the crisis in
Haiti."' 5 When the military leaders initially failed to comply with the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement, on July 31, 1994, the Security Council took the
extreme step of authorizing an invasion of Haiti by a multinational force.' 6
On the eve of the invasion, General Cedras agreed to retire his command
"when a general amnesty [was] voted into law by the Haitian parliament."' 7
The amnesty deal produced the desired effects: Aristide was permitted to
return to Haiti and reinstate a civilian government, the military leaders left
the country, much of the military surrendered its arms, and most of the
10. See Leslie A. Benton & Glenn T. Ware, Haiti: A Case Study of the International
Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis, 12 EMORY INT'L
L. REv. 851 (1998). See generally John Dugard, Retrospective Justice: International Law
and the South African Model, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN Naw
DEMocRAciEs (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
11. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEx. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1996).
12. See The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 22, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/975, S/
26063 (1993) (reproducing the text of the Governors Island Agreement). The Governors
Island Agreement was supplemented by a document known as the New York Pact, which
was signed by the two sides on July 16, 1993. Paragraph 4 of the New York Pact pro-
vides that "[t]he political forces and parliamentary blocs undertake to ensure that the
following laws are passed, on the bases of an emergency procedure: ... (ii) Act concern-
ing the amnesty." Id.
13. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti, Searching for Alternatives, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND PRACTICE 185, 188 (N. Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (Pro-
fessor Stotzky of the University of Miami School of Law served as Aristide's Legal
Adviser while Aristide was in exile in the United States).
14. Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th
mtg. at 120, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).
15. Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3298th
mtg. at 126, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).
16. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. cl 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
17. Haitian Lawmakers Pass Partial Amnesty to Pressure Cedras, CoMMERcIAL APPEA.
(Memphis), Oct. 8, 1994, at IA, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, COMAPP File.
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human rights abuses ended - all with practically no bloodshed or
resistance.18
2. South Africa
From 1960 to 1994, thousands of black South Africans were persecuted
under that country's apartheid system.19 With the prospect of a bloody
civil war looming over negotiations, "[t]he outgoing leaders made some
form of amnesty for those responsible for the regime a condition for the
peaceful transfer to a fully democratic society. ' 20 The leaders of the major-
ity black population decided that the commitment to grant amnesty was a
fair price for a relatively peaceful transition to full democracy. 21 In accord-
ance with the negotiated settlement between the major parties, on July 19,
1995, the South African Parliament created a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, consisting of a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a
Committee on Amnesty, and a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilita-
tion.22 Under this process, amnesty would only be available to individuals
who personally applied for it and who fully disclosed the facts of their
apartheid crimes. 23 After conducting 140 public hearings and considering
20,000 written and oral submissions, the South African Truth Commission
published a 2739-page report of its findings on October 29, 1998.24 Most
observers believe the amnesty in South Africa headed off increasing ten-
sions and a potential civil war.2
5
3. The Dayton Accords
As a counterpoint to these examples, commentators cite the successful
negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accord, which required the parties of the
Bosnian conflict to cooperate in the prosecution of offenders before an
international tribunal. 26 The facts behind the Dayton Accord, however,
suggest that "realpolitik" considerations once again prevailed over princi-
ples of justice.27 On the eve of the Dayton talks, the Prosecutor of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, formally asked the United States
to make the surrender of indicted suspects a condition for any peace
accord.28 The U.S. negotiators responded that they would not make such a
18. See Maggie O'Kane, After the Yanks Have Gone, THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 18, 1995, at
24, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
19. See Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South
Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 Amiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463 (1996).
20. MARTia MINoW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGrvENESS 52 (1998).
21. See id. at 55.
22. See The National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Act No. 34, 1995, Republic of
South Africa, Government Gazette, vol. 361, No. 16579 (Cape Town, July 26, 1995).
23. See id. at 20(c).
24. The text of the South African Truth Commission's Report is available on the
Internet at <www.truth.org.za>.
25. See MINOW, supra note 20, at 55.
26. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 9, at 259-85.
27. Stephen Engelberg, Panel Seeks U.S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals, N.Y. TIMES,




condition a "show stopper" to the larger peace settlement.29 While the
accord ultimately contained several vague references to cooperating with
the international tribunal,30 it did not stipulate a role for the 60,000-strong
NATO implementation force in apprehending indicted war criminals. As
one of the Dayton negotiators confided, "[E]veryone who was at the Dayton
proximity talks knew that if this issue was pressed it could have ruined the
talks."31 As a consequence, NATO argued first that it did not have the
authority, and later that it did not have the mandate, to apprehend such
persons.32 Some nineteen months after the NATO deployment in Bosnia,
the NATO troops began to arrest a handful of Serb warlords who were per-
ceived as a threat to NATO's mission and security, but as of October 1999,
the two most wanted indictees - Radovan Karadizic and Ratko Mladic -
remain at large in Bosnia.33
Even more telling is the fact that during the Dayton negotiations, chief
U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke refused to address the issue of Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic's responsibility for the atrocities in Bosnia,
saying it is "not my role here to make a judgment," and adding: "You can't
make peace without President Milosevic. ' 34 Although Milosevic was sub-
sequently indicted by the International Tribunal for the role he played in
atrocities in Kosovo in 1999,3 5 he has not been charged with responsibility
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide committed
in Bosnia from 1992-95. Moreover, while President Clinton has condi-
tioned the lifting of sanctions on Serbia on the ouster of Milosevic, the
surrender of Milosevic to the International Tribunal is not part of the bar-
gain.36 Thus, there is little chance that Milosevic wil ever be brought to
justice, although in a sense he has become a prisoner within the borders of
his own country. This has led at least one commentator to conclude: "It
highly appears likely that Slobodan Mlosevic... was at least implicitly
promised some type of immunity from prosecution in return for his reduc-
ing support to the Bosnian Serbs and agreeing to the Dayton and Paris
Accords."37
29. See id.
30. See Permanent Representative of the United States: Report to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/50/790, S/1995/999 (1995).
31. Anonymous, supra note 2, at 256.
32. See Col. Frederick Michael Lorenz, Peace Operations and War Criminals: Testing
the Limits of Military Force (Nov. 17, 1996); MicHAm_ P. ScHARi, BALKAN JusTIcE 89
(1997).
33. Michael P. Scharf, Indicted for War Crimes, Then What, WASH. PosT, Oct. 3, 1999,
at B-1.
34. Jurek Martin, U.S. Fears Wider War in Balkans If Bosnia Talks Fail, FIN. TIMEs
(London), Nov. 2, 1995, at 3.
35. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoijub
Ojdanic, and Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Indictment issued 22 May 1999 (visited Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.org.icty/indictment>.
36. See Michael P. Scharf, War Criminals Must Be Prosecuted, BOSTON HERALD, July 3,
1999, at 15.
37. Forsyth, supra note 2, at 11.
Cornell International Law Journal
4. Amnesty Is Not Equivalent to Impunity
It is a common misconception that granting amnesty from prosecution is
equivalent to foregoing accountability and redress. As the Haitian and
South African situations indicate, amnesty is often tied to accountability
mechanisms that are less invasive than domestic or international prosecu-
tion. Where amnesty has been traded for peace, the concerned govern-
ments have made monetary reparations to the victims and their families,
established truth commissions to document the abuses (and sometimes
identify perpetrators by name), and have instituted employment bans and
purges (referred to as "lustration') that keep such perpetrators from posi-
tions of public trust.38 While not the same as criminal prosecution, these
mechanisms do encompass the fundamentals of a criminal justice system:
prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation.39 Indeed, some
experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a second best
approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many situations
they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice.40
B. The Benefits of Prosecution
Although providing amnesty may sometimes be necessary to achieve peace,
there are important considerations favoring prosecution that suggest
amnesty should be a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for
extreme situations. In particular, prosecuting persons responsible for vio-
lations of international humanitarian law can serve to discourage future
human rights abuses, deter vigilante justice, and reinforce respect for law
and the new democratic government.
While prosecutions might initially provoke resistance, some analysts
believe that national reconciliation cannot take place as long as justice is
foreclosed. 41 As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman of the U.N. Investi-
gative Commission for Yugoslavia, has stated, "if peace is not intended to
be a brief interlude between conflicts," then it must be accompanied by
justice.42
Failure to prosecute leaders responsible for human rights abuses
breeds contempt for the law and encourages future violations. The U.N.
Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have concluded that impunity
is a major reason for continuing human rights violations of throughout the
world.4 3 Fact-finding reports on Chile and El Salvador indicate that
38. See NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 281-304 (1995).
39. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 21-63 (1994).
40. MiNow, supra note 20, at 9 (contending that prosecutions "are slow, partial, and
narrow").
41. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 9, 13 (1996).
42. Id.
43. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Conse-
quences of Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13, reproduced in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTIcE:
How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 18, 19 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).
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amnesty or de facto impunity has led to an increase in abuses in those
countries.44
What a new or reinstated democracy needs most is legitimacy, which
requires a fair, credible and transparent account of what took place and
who was responsible. Criminal trials (especially those involving proof of
widespread and systematic abuses) can generate a comprehensive record of
the nature and extent of violations: how they were planned and executed,
the fate of individual victims, and who gave the orders and who carried
them out. While there are various means to develop the historic record of
such abuses, the most authoritative rendering of the truth is only possible
through a trial that accords full due process. Supreme CourtJustice Robert
Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at Niirnberg, underscored the logic of this
proposition when he reported that the most important legacy of the Nurn-
berg trial was the documentation of Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity
and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes
in the future."45 According to Jackson, the establishment of an authorita-
tive record of abuses that would endure the test of time and withstand the
challenge of revisionism required proof "of incredible events by credible
evidence."46
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. While
a state may appropriately forgive crimes (such as treason or sedition)
against itself, serious crimes against persons (such as rape and murder)
are an altogether different matter. A state may owe a duty to the victims
and their families to hold violators accountable for their acts. Prosecuting
and punishing the violators would give significance to the victims' suffer-
ing and serve as partial remedy for their injuries. Moreover, prosecutions
help restore victims' dignity and prevent private acts of revenge by those
who, in the absence of justice, may take it into their own hands.47
While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the value of law by
displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible
for widespread human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of
law and distrust toward the political system. To the victims of human
rights crimes, amnesty represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: while victims
struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed
to enjoy a comfortable retirement. When those with power are seen to be
above the law, the ordinary citizen will find it difficult to believe in the
44. See, e.g., Report Prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in Chile, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, ' 341, U.N. Doc. A/38/
385 (1983).
45. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, Oct. 7, 1946, reprinted in
REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON MiLITARY TRIALs 432 (Dept. of State, Pub. 3080, 1949).
46. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39
Am. J. ITr'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945).
47. Haitian citizens, for example, have committed acts of violence against the former
members of the brutal military regime who were given amnesty for their abuses. See
Former General is Killed in Haiti, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 4.
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principle of the rule of law as a fundamental necessity in a democratic
country.
Finally, where international organizations give their imprimatur to
amnesty, there is a risk that rogue regimes in other parts of the world will
be encouraged to engage in gross abuses. For example, history records that
the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials responsible for the
massacre of over one million Armenians during World War I encouraged
Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Germany could pur-
sue his genocidal policies with impunity. 48 In a 1939 speech to his reluc-
tant General Staff, Hider remarked, "Who after all is today speaking about
the destruction of the Armenians?" 4 9 Richard Goldstone, former Prosecu-
tor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, has
concluded that the failure of the international community to prosecute Pol
Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, and Mohammed Aidid, among others,
encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in the for-
mer Yugoslavia with the expectation that they would not be held accounta-
ble for their international crimes.5 0 When the international community
encourages or endorses amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends a signal
to other rogue regimes that they have nothing to lose by instituting repres-
sive measures. Such regimes can always bargain away their crimes by
agreeing to peace.
II. The Limited International Legal Obligation to Prosecute
In a few narrowly defined situations, there is an international legal obliga-
tion to prosecute regardless of the underlying practical considerations. An
amnesty given to the members of a former regime could be invalidated in a
proceeding before either the state's domestic courts5 1 or an international
forum. 5 2 It would be inappropriate for an international criminal court to
defer to a national amnesty in a situation where the amnesty violates obli-
48. See Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug.
22, 1939), reprinted in M. CHERiF BAssioum, CRuMEs AGAINST HtauAirY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 176 n.96 (1992).
49. Id.
50. See Michael Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7
DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 398 n.128 (1997).
51. When the South African amnesty scheme was challenged on the grounds that it
violated the rights of families to seek judicial redress for the murders of their loved ones,
the newly-created Constitutional Court rejected the claim on the ground that neither the
South African Constitution nor any applicable treaty prevented granting amnesty in
exchange for truth. See Azanian Peoples Organization v. President of the Republic of
South Africa, Case CCt 17.96, Constitutional Court of South Africa, July 25, 1996.
52. "Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Suriname,
and Uruguay have been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
of the Organization of American States." Dianne F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The




gations contained in the very international conventions that make up the
court's subject matter jurisdiction.53
A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions
A state's prerogative to issue amnesty for an offense can be circumscribed
by treaties to which the state is a party.54 There are several international
conventions that dearly provide a duty to prosecute humanitarian or
human rights crimes defined therein, including in particular the "grave
breaches" provisions of the'1949 Geneva Conventions,5 5 and the Genocide
Convention.56 When these Conventions are applicable, the granting of
amnesty to persons responsible for committing the crimes defined therein
would constitute a breach of a treaty obligation for which there can be no
excuse or exception.57 It is important to recognize, however, that these
Conventions were negotiated in the context of the cold war and by design
apply only to a narrow range of situations.
1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions codified the international rules relat-
ing to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in occupied terri-
tory.58 Almost every country of the world is party to these conventions.59
Each of the Geneva Conventions contains a specific enumeration of grave
breaches, which are war crimes under international law for which there is
individual criminal liability and for which states have a corresponding
duty to prosecute or extradite.60 Grave breaches include willful killing, tor-
ture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, extensive destruction of property not justified by
military necessity, wilfully depriving a civilian of the rights of fair and reg-
53. See Gerhard Hafner et al., A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth
Wedgwood, 10 EuPR J. INT'L L. 109, 111 (1999).
54. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 l.L.M. 679.
55. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 238; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
287.
56. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 54, art. 26.
58. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 55.
59. See Bassiouni, supra note 48, at 164 ("Presently, over 155 countries have
included [Geneva provisions] in their military laws...').
60. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 55, art. 50.
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ular trial, and unlawful confinement of a civilian.61 The Rome Statute
reproduces this list in Article 8, subsection (2)(a).62
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for,
prosecute and punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions unless they choose to hand over such persons for trial by another
state party.63 The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, which is the
official history of the negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties,
confirms that the obligation to prosecute Grave Breaches is "absolute,"
meaning, inter alia, that States Parties can under no circumstances grant
perpetrators immunity or amnesty from prosecution for grave breaches of
the Conventions. 64
It is important to recognize that there is no corresponding obligation
to prosecute with respect to "other violations of the laws and customs of
war" applicable in international armed conflicts, as listed in Article 8, sub-
section (2)(b) of the Rome Statute.65 In addition, while states or interna-
tional tribunals may prosecute persons who commit war crimes in internal
armed conflicts (see Article 8, subsections (2)(c) and (2)(e) of the Rome
Statute), the duty to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conven-
tions is limited to the context of international armed conflict.6 6 Further,
there is a high threshold of violence necessary to constitute a genuine
armed conflict, as distinct from lower level disturbances such as riots or
isolated and sporadic acts of fighting.67 Moreover, to be an international
armed conflict, the situation must constitute an armed conflict involving
two or more states, or a partial or total occupation of the territory of one
state by another.68
2. The Genocide Convention
The International Court of Justice has determined that the substantive pro-
visions of the Genocide Convention constitute customary international law
binding on all states.69 Like the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Con-
vention provides an absolute obligation to prosecute persons responsible
for genocide as defined in the Convention. 70
61. See id.
62. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a), U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 183/9, July 17, 1998, reprinted in 3 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 723, 726 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
63. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 55, art. 49.
64. See VIRGINIA MoRIs & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 114 (1995) (quotingJ. Pictet ed.,
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, Commentary to article 51, at 373); see also THEO-
DOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NoRMs AS CUSTOMARY LAw 215 (1989).
65. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 8(2)(b).
66. See Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supra note 55, art. 2.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 62, arts. 8(2)(c), (0.
68. See Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supra note 55, art. 2.
69. See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.Cj. 23 (advisory
opinion).
70. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are consti-
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Both the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute define genocide
as one of the following acts when committed "with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such":
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.7 1
There are several important limitations inherent in this definition.
First, to constitute genocide, there must be proof that abuses were commit-
ted with the specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. 72 It is
not enough that abuses were intended to repress opposition-the intent
must be literally to destroy the opposition.73 Second, and even more
importantly, the victims of such abuses must constitute one of the four
specific groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention, namely, national,
ethnic, racial, or religious groups.74 In this respect, it is noteworthy that
the drafters of the Genocide Convention deliberately excluded acts directed
against "political groups" from the Convention's definition of genocide.75
B. General Human Rights Conventions
General human rights conventions include the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,76 the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,7 7 and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 78 Although these treaties do not expressly require
states to prosecute violators, they do obligate states to "ensure" the rights
tutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Article 5 requires
states to "provide effective penalties" for persons guilty of genocide. See Genocide Con-
vention, supra note 56, art. 4.
71. Id. art. II. See also Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 6.
72. See Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INr'T & COMP. I.J. 1, 22-26 (1994).
73. See id. (describing the "intent to destroy").
74. See Genocide Convention, supra note 56.
75. The exclusion of "political groups" was due in large part to the fact that the
Genocide Convention was negotiated during the Cold War, during which the Soviet
Union and other totalitarian governments feared that they would face interference in
their internal affairs if genocide were defined to include acts committed to destroy polit-
ical groups. See L. KuPER, GENOcIDE 30 (1982). According to Professor Kuper, "one may
fairly say that the delegates, after all, represented governments in power, and that many
of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress political
opposition." Id.
76. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 15, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
77. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
78. American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Jan. 7, 1970, O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970).
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enumerated therein. There is growing recognition that the duty to ensure
rights implies a duty to hold specific violators accountable. 79
A careful examination of the jurisprudence of the bodies responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of the conventions suggests that
methods of obtaining specific accountability other than criminal prosecu-
tions would meet the requirement of "ensuring rights."8 0 This jurispru-
dence indicates that a state must fulfill five obligations in confronting
gross violations of human rights committed by a previous regime. States
must (1) investigate the identity, fate and whereabouts of victims; (2) inves-
tigate the identity of major perpetrators; (3) provide reparation or compen-
sation to victims; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that human rights
abuse does not recur; and (5) punish those guilty of human rights abuse. 81
Punishment can take many non-criminal forms, including imposition of
fines, removal from office, reduction of rank, and forfeiture of government
or military pensions and/or other assets. 8 2
C. Customary International Law: Crimes Against Humanity
The Rome Statute in Article 7 defines "crimes against humanity" as:
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or system-




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
() Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecutions against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... or other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
79. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 52, at 2568; Thomas Buergenthal,
To Respect and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 72, 77 (L. Henkin ed., 1981) ("obligation to 'ensure' rights creates
affirmative obligations on the state-for example, to discipline its officials"); Yoram Din-
stein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 114, 119 (L. Henkin ed., 1981) (Parties to the Covenant arguably must exercise
due diligence to prevent intentional deprivation of life by individuals, "as well as to
apprehend murderers and to prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life.").
80. See Scharf, supra note 3, at 41, 49-51; Valasquez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.






(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.83
Unlike grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the crime of
genocide, no treaty exists requiring states to prosecute crimes against
humanity, which are purely a creature of customary international law.8 4
Traditionally, those who committed crimes against humanity were treated
like pirates, as hostes humani generis (an enemy of all humankind),85 and
any state, including their own, could punish them through its domestic
courts.8 6 In the absence of a treaty containing the aut dedere aut judicare
(extradite or prosecute) principle, this so called "universal jurisdiction" is
generally thought to be permissive, not mandatory.8 7 Yet, several commen-
tators and human rights groups have recently taken the position that cus-
tomary international law not only establishes permissive jurisdiction over
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but also requires their prosecu-
tion and prohibits amnesty for such persons.88
There are strong jurisprudential reasons for recognizing such a rule.
The perpetrator of crimes against humanity incurs criminal responsibility
and is subject to punishment as a direct consequence of international law
notwithstanding the national laws of any state or states to the contrary. 89
This unique characteristic of crimes under international law makes it ques-
tionable whether any state or group of states would be competent to negate
this responsibility. Moreover, the notion of granting amnesty for crimes
against humanity would be inconsistent with the principles of individual
criminal responsibility recognized in the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment.
The fundamental purpose of these principles is to remove any possibility of
immunity for persons responsible for such crimes, from the most junior
officer acting under the orders of his superior, to the most senior govern-
ment officials, including the head of state.90
Notwithstanding these jurisprudential justifications, there is scant evi-
dence that customary international law requires the prosecution of crimes
against humanity. Customary international law, which is just as binding
83. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 7.
84. The Charter of the Niirnberg War Crimes Tribunal was the first international
instrument that codified crimes against humanity. See Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major
War Criminials of the European Axis, signed at London, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, as amended by the Berlin Protocol of 6 October 1995, reprinted in VIRGINIA
MoRRis & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 473-
80 (1998).
85. See BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 664 (5th ed. 1979).
86. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International Treaties of an Obligation to
Investigate, Prosecute, and Provide Redress, in IMPuNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 25 (N. Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
87. See id. at 25.
88. See Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDENJ.
INT'L L. 5, 15 (1994); Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 52, at 2585, 2593; BAS-
siouNi, supra note 48, at 500-01; AMEmicAS WATCH, SPECIAL ISSUE: AccOuNTABILITY FOR
PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 2 (Dec. 1989).
89. See Robt-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 25.
90. See MoRRs & SCHARF, supra note 64, at 112-13.
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upon states as treaty law, arises from "a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation" referred to as
opinio juris.91 Under traditional notions of customary international law,
"deeds were what counted, not just words."92 Yet, those who argue that
customary international law precludes amnesty for crimes against human-
ity base their position on non-binding General Assembly Resolutions, 93
hortative declarations of international conferences, 94 and international
conventions that are not widely ratified, 95 rather than on any extensive
state practice consistent with such a rule.
Scholars have cited the U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum as the
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Sec-
tion 102(2) (1987); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 (1945) (explaining that sources of international law applied by the Court
include "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
92. BRUNO SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERJ_ INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 223 (1995).
93. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); Question of the Punishment of War
Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2712,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 78-79, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (adopted by a
vote of 55 in favor to 4 against with 33 abstentions) (condemning crimes against human-
ity and "call[ing] upon the States concerned to bring to trial persons guilty of such
crimes"); G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971) (adopted by a vote of 71 in favor to none against with 42 abstentions) (affirming
that a state's refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of
persons accused or convicted of crimes against humanity is "contrary to the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Charter and to generally recognized
norms of international law"); Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection,
Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1973) (adopted by a vote of 94 in favor to none against with 29 abstentions)
(explaining that crimes against humanity "shall be subject to investigation and the per-
sons against whom there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be
subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment"); Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
G.A. Res. 1989/65 (1989) (explaining that states shall bring to justice those accused of
having participated in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133 (1992) (equat-
ing disappearances to a crime against humanity and requiring states to try any person
suspected of having perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance).
94. The final Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference
on Human Rights affirms that "[sitates should abrogate legislation leading to impunity
for those responsible for grave violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute
such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the rule of law." World Conference
on Human Rights, Declaration and Programme of Action, Vienna, June 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf./57/23, pt. 2.
95. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 753 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov.
11, 1970) (creating no statutory limitation for crimes against humanity, irrespective of
the date of their commission), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969) (ratified by just 39 states).
Even if the Convention was more widely ratified, the prohibition on applying a statute of




earliest international recognition 9 6 of a legal obligation to prosecute perpe-
trators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provides that states
shall not grant asylum to any "person with respect to whom there are seri-
ous reasons for considering that he has committed a . . . crime against
humanity."97 Yet, according to the historic record of this resolution, "[t]he
majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under considera-
tion was not intended to propound legal norms or to change existing rules
of international law, but to lay down broad humanitarian and moral princi-
ples upon which States might rely in seeking to unify their practices relat-
ing to asylum."9 8 This demonstrates that, from the outset, the General
Assembly resolutions concerning crimes against humanity were not
intended to create any binding duties.99
In addition to this contrary legislative history, the problem with an
approach which bases the existence of customary international law so
heavily on words rather than deeds is "that it is grown like a flower in a
hot-house and that it is anything but sure that such creatures will survive
in the much rougher climate of actual state practice." 10 0 To the extent that
any state practice in this area is widespread, it is the practice of granting
amnesties or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against
humanity.1 1 That the United Nations itself has felt free of legal con-
straints in endorsing amnesty for peace deals confirms that customary
international has not yet crystallized in this area.
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III. Amnesty and the Rome Statute
The preceding discussion indicates that there are frequently no interna-
tional legal constraints to the negotiation of an amnesty for peace deal.
Moreover, swapping amnesty for peace can serve the interests of both peace
and justice in certain circumstances. During the Rome Statute negotia-
tions, the United States and a few other delegations expressed concern that
the International Criminal Court would hamper efforts to halt human
rights violations and restore peace and democracy in places like Haiti and
South Africa. 10 3
According to Philippe Kirsch, the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic
Conference, the issue was not definitively resolved during the Diplomatic
96. G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1967). See supra note 88.
97. Id. Even if the Declaration were binding, the prohibition on granting asylum is
not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute.
98. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 759.
99. See id.
100. SimmA, supra note 92, at 217.
101. See Scharf, supra note 3, at 41, 57-58 (citing numerous examples of amnesty and
de facto impunity).
102. See id.
103. See ICC PrepCom - August 1997, U.S. Delegation Draft (Rev.) (on file with the
author); Hafner et al., supra note 53, at 108, 109.
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Conference. 10 4 Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect "creative
ambiguity" 10 5 which could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of
the International Criminal Court to interpret the Rome Statute as permit-
ting recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the court.10 6
A. The Preamble
The Rome Statute's Preamble suggests that deferring a prosecution
because of the existence of a national amnesty would be incompatible with
the purpose of the Court, namely to ensure criminal prosecution of per-
sons who commit serious international crimes. 10 7 In particular, the
Preamble:
Affirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecu-
tion must be ensured ....
Recall[s] that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes.
[And] Emphasiz[es] that the International Criminal Court established under
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.10 8
The Preamble's language is important because international law pro-
vides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose." 10 9 Thus, the Preamble constitutes a
critical source of interpretation because it indicates both the treaty's con-
text and its object and purpose. Yet, notwithstanding this language, there
are several articles of the Rome Statute 1 0 that might be read as permitting
the Court under certain circumstances to recognize an amnesty exception
to its jurisdiction."' The apparent conflict between these Articles and the
Preamble reflect the schizophrenic nature of the negotiations at Rome: the
preambular language and the procedural provisions were negotiated by
entirely different drafting groups, and in the rush of the closing days of the
Rome Conference, the Drafting Committee never fully integrated and rec-
onciled the separate portions of the Statute. 112
B. Article 16: Action by the Security Council
With respect to a potential amnesty exception, the most important provi-
sion of the Rome Statute is Article 16. Under Article 16, the International
Criminal Court would be required to defer to a national amnesty if the
104. The author discussed this issue with Mr. Kirsch during an international confer-
ence in Strasbourg, France, on November 19, 1998.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Rome Statute, supra note 62, preamble.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 54, art. 31(1).
110. See infra Part III.B-D.
111. See id.
112. The author confirmed this with the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, M.
Cherif Bassiouni.
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Security Council adopts a resolution under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter requesting the Court not to commence an investigation or
prosecution, or to defer any proceedings already in progress.1 13 The Secur-
ity Council has the legal authority to require the Court to respect an
amnesty if two requirements are met, namely: (1) where the Security
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of
the peace or an act of aggression under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter; and
(2) where the resolution requesting the Court's deferral is consistent with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations with respect to main-
taining international peace and security, resolving threatening situations
in conformity with principles of justice and international law, and promot-
ing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 24
of the U.N. Charter.1 14
The decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the
Tadic case suggests that the International Criminal Court could assert that
it has the authority to independently assess whether these two require-
ments were met as part of its incidental power to determine the propriety
of its own jurisdiction (competence de la competence).1 15 This aspect of the
Appeals Chamber decision has been characterized by one commentator as
"strongly supporting those who see the U.N. Charter not as unblinkered
license for police action but as an emerging constitution of enumerated,
limited powers subject to the rule of law."116 It is possible, then, that the
International Criminal Court would not necessarily be compelled by a
Security Council Resolution to terminate an investigation or prosecution
were it to find that an amnesty contravenes international law.
While an amnesty accompanied by the establishment of a truth com-
mission, victim compensation, and lustration might be in the interests of
justice in the broad sense, it would nonetheless be in contravention of
international law where the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions or the Genocide Convention are applicable.1 17 It is especially
noteworthy that the Geneva Convention requires parties "to provide effec-
tive penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches of the Convention,"11 8 and that the Genocide
113. Article 16 of the Rome Statute, titled, "Deferral of investigation or prosecution,"
states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 16.
114. See U.N. CHATER art. 24.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeals Chamber, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995), at 6.
116. Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 245, 249 (1996).
117. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
118. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 55, art. 49.
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Convention requires parties "to provide effective penalties for persons
guilty of genocide." 19 This would suggest that the International Criminal
Court might not defer to the Security Council under Article 16 of the Rome
Statute where the accused is charged with grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions or the crime of genocide. A counter argument can be
made, however, that the Rome Statute codifies only the substantive provi-
sions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, and
does not incorporate those procedural aspects of the Conventions that
require prosecution.1 20 Accordingly, the nature of the charges might con-
stitute a significant factor to be considered, but would not necessarily be a
bar to recognizing an amnesty.
C. Article 53: Prosecutorial Discretion
Where the Security Council has not requested the International Criminal
Court to respect an amnesty-for-peace deal and thereby to terminate a pros-
ecution, the Court's Prosecutor may nevertheless choose to do so under
Article 53 of the Rome Statute.121 That Article permits the Prosecutor to
decline to initiate an investigation (even when a state party has filed a com-
plaint) where the Prosecutor concludes there are "substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice."122
However, the decision of the Prosecutor under Article 53 is subject to
review by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.123 In reviewing whether
respecting an amnesty and not prosecuting would better serve "the inter-
ests of justice," the Pre-Trial Chamber would have to evaluate the benefits
of a particular amnesty and consider whether there is an international
legal obligation to prosecute the offense. 124
D. Article 17: Complementarity
Where neither the Security Council nor the Prosecutor has requested the
International Criminal Court to defer to a national amnesty, the concerned
state can attempt to raise the issue under Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Stat-
119. Genocide Convention, supra note 56, art. V.
120. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 55, art. 49.
121. Article 53 of the Rome Statute, entitled, "Initiation of an Investigation," provides
in part:
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to
him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is
no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to
initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation
would not serve the interests of justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his
or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall
inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 53.
122. Id.
123. See id. art. 53(3).
124. See supra Part II.
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ute.12 5 Article 17(l)(a) requires the Court to dismiss a case where "the
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution." 12 6 It is significant that the Article requires
an investigation but does not specify a criminal investigation. 127 The con-
cerned state could argue that a truth commission (especially one modeled
on that of South Africa) constitutes a genuine investigation. 128 On the
other hand, subsection (2) of the Article suggests that the standard for
determining that an investigation is not genuine is whether the proceed-
ings are "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to jus-
tice"12 9 - a phrase which might be interpreted as requiring criminal
proceedings.
E. Article 20: Ne Bis In Idem
Finally, the accused can attempt to raise the issue under Article 20, which
codifies the ne bis in idem principle. 130 Article 20 provides:
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed
under [the jurisdiction of the international criminal court] shall be tried by
the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the
other Court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accord-
ance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and
were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsis-
tent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 13 1
Relying on this provision, the accused could argue that his or her confes-
sion before a truth commission, and any attendant penalties, is the func-
tional equivalent of having been tried and convicted for the same offense
that he or she is charged with by the International Criminal Court.
There are two problems with this argument, however. First, the provi-
sion speaks of trial by "another court," and a truth commission is not a
court; second, as with Article 17, Article 20 is not applicable to proceed-
ings "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice."132
Conclusion
David J. Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues has
remarked that "one must understand that amnesty is always on the table in
125. See Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 17(1)(a).
126. Id. art. 17(a).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. art. 17(2).
130. The international law equivalent to the prohibition against double jeopardy.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 62, art. 20.
132. Id.
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[peace] negotiations."' 33 Ambassador Scheffer is largely correct in that
there are frequently no legal constraints to the negotiation of an amnesty-
for-peace deal. 134 This is because international procedural law imposing a
duty to prosecute is far more limited than the substantive law establishing
international offenses.
This can be illustrated with the situation in Kosovo in the spring of
1999. The reported Serb atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians would
certainly constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes in an internal
armed conflict, but they would not amount to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and it is not at all clear that acts of genocide had been com-
mitted.135 Since there is no international duty to prosecute crimes against
humanity, or war crimes in an internal conflict, an amnesty for peace deal
would not violate international law.136 Thus, the rejection of such a deal
by the NATO negotiators was a political, not a legal, decision. Had an
amnesty-for-peace deal been employed to end the Kosovo conflict, and had
there existed an ICC with jurisdiction over the matter, what would have
been the consequences? The answer would depend on the contours of the
amnesty arrangement.
The Rome Statute is purposely ambiguous on the question of whether
the International Criminal Court should defer to such an amnesty-for-
peace arrangement in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction. 13 7
While amnesties are often a necessary bargaining chip in negotiations for
the peaceful transfer of political power, it must be recognized that amnes-
ties may vary greatly. 138 Some, as in South Africa, are closely linked to
mechanisms for providing accountability and redress; 139 others are simply
a mindful forgetting. The International Criminal Court should take only
the former types of amnesties into account in prosecutorial decisions.
Moreover, the Court should be particularly reluctant to defer to an amnesty
in situations involving violations of international conventions that create
obligations to prosecute.
Thus, in determining whether to defer to an amnesty arrangement in
accordance with Articles 16, 53, 17, or 20 of its statute, the International
Criminal Court should consider the following six questions: (1) Do the
offenses constitute grave breaches of the Geneva conventions or genocide,
for which there is an international obligation to prosecute? (2) Would an
end to the fighting or transition from repressive rule have occurred without
some form of amnesty agreement? (3) Has the State or international com-
munity instituted a mechanism designed to discover the truth about vic-
tims and attribute individual responsibility to the perpetrators? (4) Has the
State provided victims with adequate reparation and/or compensation? (5)
133. Remarks by David Scheffer at International Law Weekend (Nov. 2, 1996), quoted
in Scharf, supra note 3, at 60.
134. See supra Part II.
135. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
136. See supra Part II.
137. See supra Part Ill.
138. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.
139. See supra Part I.A.2.
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Has the State implemented meaningful steps to ensure that violations of
international humanitarian law and serious human rights abuses do not
recur? (6) Has the State taken steps to punish those guilty of committing
violations of international humanitarian law through non-criminal sanc-
tions, such as imposition of fines, removal from office, reduction of rank,
and forfeiture of government or military pensions and/or other assets?140
Even where the answers to the above questions suggest that the particular
amnesty arrangement serves both the interests of peace and justice, the
International Criminal Court should defer prosecution only in the most
compelling of cases in light of its core purpose as reflected in the Preamble
to the Rome Statute.
140. See Norman Dorsen & Paul van Zyl, Justice Without Punishment: Guaranteeing
Human Rights in Transitional Societies 16-19 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author).

